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Abstract
It is a long known fact that climate change will result in sea level rise and dramatically changed 
coastlines for a number of coastal States, and the physical consequences of sea level rise are most 
likely unavoidable for several coastal States due to their geographical location, size and 
topography. It is highly debatable whether the Law of the Sea Convention is equipped for dealing 
with the current challenges of sea level rise and maritime limits, and it may be argued that its 
rule of ambulatory baselines may contribute to loss of territory, relocation of maritime zones, 
uncertainty and instability.
This article investigates the current status of the law regulating maritime limits which may be 
affected by sea level rise, and argues that the best solution is to adapt the law within the current 
legal framework of the Law of the Sea, by undertaking a liberal interpretation of the already 
existing provisions of the LOSC, instead of invoking the amendment procedures of the LOSC, 
a new supplementary agreement or creating new customary law. In particular, the article explores 
the option of re-interpreting the law of baselines in Article 7, offering an adapting measure that 
mitigates the climate change effects on sea level rise. It is argued that a liberal interpretation of 
the LOSC can contribute to increased stability and juridical protection of the maritime 
entitlements for some of the States suffering the consequences of sea level rise.
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1. Introduction
For three decades, scientists have warned us of climate change, global warming and 
sea level rise.1 In its fifth report, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change 
(IPCC) estimated a sea level rise from the 1986 level to between 26 and 82 centime-
tres by the end of this century.2 In addition, regional sea level changes will differ 
substantially from the global average.3
For low-lying coastal States, the consequences of such a rise in sea level will be 
catastrophic. It is estimated that a one-metre sea level rise will flood territory that is 
presently home to more than 60 million people.4 A one-metre sea level rise will sub-
merge approximately fifteen percent of Bangladesh and displace more than seven 
million inhabitants in the Mekong delta area of Vietnam alone.5 The low-lying areas 
that are not entirely submerged will be particularly vulnerable to periodic flooding 
and exposed to extreme weather conditions; saline intrusion will affect agricultural 
land and contaminate freshwater sources.6 Low-tide elevations, reefs, rocks and 
low-lying islands may be flooded or damaged by erosion. Small island States may 
partially or fully disappear due to sea level rise, or they may be rendered uninhabit-
able. The changing coastline affects the location of a number of maritime limits. 
National boundaries may be affected, and in certain instances particularly vulnerable 
States risk losing land territory that is the basis for their existence.7
Ever since the IPCC issued its first report in 1990, legal scholars have pointed 
to the insufficiencies of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)8 as regards the law 
on baselines, and have called for a change.9 Amongst others, Caron10 and Soons11 
published their research on the effect that sea level rise would have on maritime 
boundaries.12 They observed that the legislation concerning the establishment of the 
different maritime limits was in no shape to tackle the expected sea level rise, and 
they expressed concern about how the law of the sea could adapt to the changes. 
They called for change, either by means of amending the rules of the LOSC, a new 
supplementary agreement, or new customary law.
Close to thirty years later, the same questions are raised, and the same arguments 
made. The legal framework remains unchanged. This article sets out to discuss the 
current status of the laws on maritime limits that may be affected by sea level rise and 
focuses on measures that may be taken within the current legal framework to adapt 
to sea level rise, instead of calling for amendments or a new supplementary agree-
ment, or creating new customary law. More concretely, the question raised is whether 
we can adapt to sea level rise by means of re-interpreting the law on baselines, and in 
particular Article 7(2) of the LOSC on delta baselines.
In the following, I will first briefly discuss the issue of sea level rise in connection 
with maritime boundaries. Next, I will discuss the consequences of sea level rise for 
particularly vulnerable States, before I discuss the scope of the application and inter-
pretation of Article 7. I will discuss the extent to which more stable baselines can be 
the appropriate response to unstable coastlines.
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2. Ambulatory baselines and shifting maritime zones
To discuss the effects of sea level rise on maritime boundaries, we must first explore 
the legal framework applicable to maritime boundaries. The waters off a coastal State 
are divided into different maritime zones, where the coastal State enjoys various 
degrees of sovereignty, sovereign rights, and legislative and enforcement jurisdiction. 
The outer limit of each maritime zone is, in most instances, drawn based on a dis-
tance criterion measured from the baselines. Hence, the baselines separate the inter-
nal waters from the territorial sea, and they serve a much more extensive purpose. 
Article 5 of the LOSC provides that the normal baseline “is the low-water line along 
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State”.
However, the normal baseline is affected by several geographical circumstances, 
which allow for the application of special provisions. If any naturally formed low-tide 
elevations are situated wholly or partially within twelve nautical miles (nm) from the 
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the base-
line for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.13 In certain instances, the LOSC 
also provides an option for the coastal State to establish straight baselines.14 Such 
baselines allow the coastal State to draw straight lines joining appropriate points 
in cases where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or there is a fringe of 
islands along the coast or in its immediate vicinity. Although it may be possible to 
draw normal baselines along the low-water line in such instances, this is not practical, 
and makes it difficult to ascertain the location of the outer limit of the territorial sea. 
Straight baselines are drawn by joining appropriate points, which do not depart to 
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and include only those 
sea areas sufficiently closely linked to the land domain.15 A straight baseline cannot 
be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or other installations, 
which are permanently above sea level, have been built on them, or the drawing of 
such a baseline has received general international recognition.16 The reason for this is 
presumably to prevent baselines from being drawn too far seawards from the coast, 
in adherence with Article 7(3) of the LOSC. In addition, straight baseline may not 
cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or EEZ.17 The LOSC 
also provides separate rules regarding how to establish baselines enclosing rivers, 
bays and harbor works.
Since the baselines are established along the low-water mark or on the basis of low-
tide elevations, the baselines constitute so-called ambulatory limits. This means that 
baselines will shift due to coastal realignment. This is an example of the principle that 
“the land dominates the sea”.18 The shifting baselines directly affect the location of 
the remaining maritime limits.
Article 3 of the LOSC provides that the breadth of the territorial sea shall not 
exceed 12 nm measured from the baselines. Similarly, Article 33 provides that the 
contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nm from the baselines, whilst Article 57 
provides that the EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nm from the baselines. If the 
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baselines of a coastal State move as a result of sea level rise, the above-mentioned 
limits must also be relocated. This does not diminish the size of each specific mari-
time zone, as both the inner and outer limits of the zone are moved. However, this may 
have severe consequences for the coastal State, as different maritime zones are subject 
to different legal regimes. A relocation of the different zones affects the coastal State’s 
legislative, jurisdictional and enforcement powers. Overall, a landward relocation on 
the different maritime zones will diminish the sovereign area of the coastal State.
The territorial sea is part of the coastal State’s territory and is subject to its exclusive 
sovereignty.19 Other States enjoy the right of innocent passage, but they are subject to 
the coastal States’ laws and regulations. Article 3 of the LOSC provides that the breadth 
of the territorial sea shall not exceed 12 nm measured from the baselines. This means 
that, if the baselines move landwards, areas that originally were part of the territorial sea 
will instead become part of the EEZ and be subject to the rules in part 5 of the LOSC.
In a belt of sea contiguous to the territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the 
control necessary to prevent or punish the infringement of customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion and sanitary laws in its territory and territorial sea. Article 33 provides that the 
contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nm from the baselines. Consequently, 
the entire contiguous zone will be relocated when baselines move.
The most severe effects of shifting maritime limits will probably occur when an 
area that was previously part of the EEZ becomes high seas. Article 57 provides that 
the EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nm from the baselines. In the EEZ, the coastal 
State possesses sovereign rights over living and non-living natural resources in the 
sea-bed and water column, and all other states possess the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight. When part of the former EEZ becomes high seas, it is open to all 
states, which can then exercise the freedoms of navigation and overflight; the freedom 
to lay submarine cables and pipelines; the freedom to construct artificial islands and 
other installations; and the freedom to fish and conduct scientific research. The relo-
cation of the EEZ limit may cause stocks that primarily occurred within the EEZ of 
the coastal State to occur both within the EEZ and the adjacent high seas. In such 
cases, the coastal State and other States fishing the same stock are obligated to agree 
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of the stock in the adjacent area. 
Likewise, transboundary stocks and straddling stocks previously traversing between 
the EEZ and the high seas may stop occurring in the EEZ, which would require the 
coastal State to adjust its total allowable catch and quotas and could have severe 
economic implications. The status of non-living resources of the EEZ is slightly dif-
ferent, since such resources are also regulated as part of the continental shelf regime.
Finally, the question arises whether the location of baselines is relevant to the loca-
tion of continental shelf limits. If the continental margin of a coastal State does not 
extend to the distance of 200 nm from the baselines, a 200 nm continental shelf will 
be measured from the baselines. Article 76(5) of The LOSC also provides a so-called 
constraint line for cases in which the continental margin continues far seawards of 
the 200 nm line, providing that “the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not 
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exceed 350 nm from the baselines, or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 
2500 mater isobath”. This suggests that the outer limit of the continental shelf in 
certain cases may also be measured from the baseline. If the constraint line is not 
invoked, the continental shelf limits are established along the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin in accordance with Article 76(1).
It can be argued that continental shelf limits are in a unique position, as Article 
76(9) specifically provides that “[t]he coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations chars and relevant information (…) permanently 
describing the outer limits of the continental shelf”. The reference to “permanently 
describing” has been the subject of debate among legal scholars, but there seems to 
be a mutual understanding that such limits are unalterable and accordingly not vul-
nerable to sea level change.20
Further, the question should be raised if “permanently established” limits refers only 
to outer continental shelf limits established along the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or if it also applies to continental shelf limits based on the distance criterions 
in Article 76. Although the wording of Article 76(9) may be read as a continuation of 
the “final and binding” requirement included in paragraph (8) for limits established 
along the continental margin, it is important to note that the reference to “permanently 
describing” is included in a separate provision in the article and not as part of para-
graph (8). The wording of paragraph (9) makes no distinction between the continental 
shelf within or beyond 200 nm, but merely speaks of “the outer limits of the continental 
shelf”, a phrase that encompasses all continental shelf delineation limits.21 In fact, none 
of the provisions in Article 76, except for paragraph (8), makes any distinction between 
the 200 nm continental shelf and the continental shelf beyond that distance. Similarly, 
Article 83 on continental shelf delimitation makes no such distinction. Deciding that 
only continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm are permanent, whilst ordinary 200 nm 
continental shelf limits are ambulatory, has no legal basis and would seem unjust.22 The 
effect of Article 76(9) is accordingly that all continental shelf limits are permanently 
established and will not be affected by sea level rise and shifting baselines.
3. States Particularly Vulnerable to Sea Level Rise
The general consequences of sea level rise for the maritime zones of coastal States 
discussed above result in moving baselines and shifting maritime limits that affect the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of coastal States.
However, some States are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise for several rea-
sons. They are vulnerable due to their geographical location, size and topography. 
Large areas of low-lying States will be submerged, and the low-lying areas that are 
not entirely submerged will be particularly exposed to extreme weather conditions 
and vulnerable to periodic floods. Saline intrusion will impact agricultural land and 
contaminate freshwater sources. Coastal ecosystems, coastal infrastructure and 
human settlement are at risk.
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Another category of particularly vulnerable States are small island States. In addi-
tion to the risks of submerged areas, floods and saline intrusion, low-lying islands are 
in an even more critical position, as they risk experiencing a significant reduction in 
the spatial extent of marine areas subject to national jurisdiction.23 Changed base-
lines will impact national claims of maritime jurisdiction and will have economic and 
jurisdictional consequences. It follows from Article 121(3) of the LOSC that “rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. If an island is rendered uninhabitable 
due to sea level change, coastal States are at risk of losing large areas of economic 
zones and potentially a continental shelf that extends far beyond 200 nm from the 
baselines of the specific island.24 If the entire land territory of the coastal State is 
submerged, the question arises whether that State can continue to exist as a State 
without a territory.25 However, this topic goes beyond the scope of this paper.
States may also be particularly vulnerable to sea level rise for legal reasons. Soons 
argues that, if two coastal States are situated less than 400 nm from each other (for 
EEZ and continental shelf delimitation) or less than 24 nm from each other (for 
territorial sea delimitation), and they have entered into a boundary agreement in 
which the boundary has been drawn between basepoints determined by geographic 
coordinates, it must “in principle be concluded that changes in the geographical 
configuration as a result of sea level rise will not result in changes in the boundary 
line”.26 Similarly, boundaries established by international adjudication are consid-
ered final, binding and not appealable.27 States that have not entered into delimita-
tion agreements with neighboring States or established their boundaries in 
accordance with international adjudication, are more vulnerable to the effects of sea 
level rise.
4. Stable Baselines as Response to Unstable Coastlines
4.1 Introduction
The major weakness of the Law of the Sea Convention in relation to the current 
challenge of sea level rise and maritime limits is the rule of ambulatory baselines, 
which contributes to loss of territory, relocation of maritime zones, uncertainty and 
instability.
A number of scholars have proposed solutions to the problem of climate-induced 
sea level rise. Schofield and Freestone point out that the easiest option is to do noth-
ing. Rather than protect the coast and try to stabilize the limits, the State can choose 
to accept the consequences of climate change, plan their retreat and relocate the 
limits.28 However, it is quite obvious that the costs of such a strategy would be highly 
disadvantageous. Schofield and Freestone suggest that a State can seek to protect its 
coast by building structures to prevent erosion, saline intrusion, floods, etc. Other 
authors, such as Caron and Soons, call for raising the question whether the provi-
sions of the LOSC need to be amended.
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However, the amendment procedures of the LOSC have never been initiated, and 
it does not seem likely that any State party will seek to change the LOSC rules on 
baselines by invoking the amendment procedures.29 This article therefore focuses on 
the possibilities of adapting to the consequences of climate change and sea level rise 
whilst operating within the current legal regime.
4.2 Delta baselines as a separate category of straight baselines
Some coasts are more vulnerable to sea level fluctuation than others due to the nature 
of their coastline. Low-lying States with large river deltas, such as Bangladesh and 
Vietnam, are examples of such vulnerable States. The LOSC provides a special 
regime of straight baselines in areas where a delta and other natural conditions ren-
der the coastline highly unstable. In such situations, the appropriate points may be 
selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line. This provision is the 
result of an informal position paper on the issue of baselines submitted by Bangladesh 
during UNCLOS III, which describes the particular challenges of Bangladesh, with 
its highly shifting and unstable baseline, where no stable water line or demarcation of 
landward and seaward areas exists. Therefore, Bangladesh suggested including a 
 provision on deltas:
(…) if the water adjacent to the coast is marked by continual process of alluvion and 
sedimentation creating a highly unstable low water line the method of straight baselines 
joining appropriate points on the coast or on the coastal waters may be employed in 
drawing the baseline (…).30
When the informal consultative group on baselines provided the revised consoli-
dated text on baselines, the provision on deltaic baselines was formulated in its cur-
rent form “where because of the presence of a delta [and] other natural conditions 
the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the 
furthest seaward extent of the low-water line”.31 Although Article 7(2) on delta base-
lines was drafted with the specific case of the Ganges/Brahmaputra River Delta in 
mind, it may also be applied to other deltaic countries, such as Burma, Egypt, 
Nigeria and Vietnam.
Some authors have raised questions about the relationship between Article 7(1) 
and (2), asking whether application of paragraph 2 also requires that the coastline be 
deeply indented and cut into or where there is the presence of a fringe of islands as 
prescribed in paragraph 1.32 The United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea33 provided in its study on baselines that “this paragraph is subordinate 
to paragraph 1 and is not an alternative to it. In other words, for paragraph 2 to apply, 
the coastline of the delta must satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph 1”.34 The 
majority of legal scholars have oriented in the same direction. Reisman and Westerman 
observe that “[t]his provision does not constitute a discharge from the preliminary 
geographical requirements of Article 7(1). These must still be fulfilled before the 
claimant state may proceed to Article 7(2).”35 Twenty years later, Schofield and Sas 
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similarly observed that “[t]he remainder of article 7 can be viewed as being depen-
dent on this first paragraph, providing guidance on how straight baselines are to be 
defined but not in itself offering justifications for their construction”.36 Churchill and 
Lowe note that it is not clear whether Article 7(2) is laying down a third kind of 
coastline in addition to deeply indented coasts and coasts fringed with islands, or 
if  paragraph 2 applies only to deltas on coasts that fall into the categories of 
Article 7(1). Still, they argue that the drafting history of Article 7 suggests that para-
graph 2 is intended to apply to the latter, thereby making paragraph 2 subordinate to 
paragraph 1.37
Prescott and Schofield do not express any concern about the ambiguity between 
paragraphs 1 and 2, and observe that the discussion is mainly of an academic nature. 
They argue that the countries that possess deltas will be untroubled by the relation-
ship between paragraphs 1 and 2 based on a prediction that deltas characteristically 
have distributaries that can be regarded as deep indentions or that the outer edge of 
the delta is formed by islands, which can be considered a fringe.38 They observe that 
Bangladesh, Venezuela and Vietnam could justify straight baselines around the edge 
of their major deltas on the ground of being deeply indented or fringed with islands, 
or both.
Hoque, who represents a minority amongst scholars, raises the timely question: 
if the deltaic coast is highly indented or fringed by a number of islands, then what 
is the necessity of paragraph 2, if straight baselines can be drawn by the deltaic 
State under paragraph 1?39 He continues by observing that, “if the retreating del-
taic coast is neither highly indented nor fringed by islands, this paragraph cannot 
give them any protection to the interest of that coast, which is against the objective 
of the inclusion of this paragraph”.40 Hoque accordingly seems to argue that, if 
paragraph 2 is considered subordinate to paragraph 1, paragraph 2 is restricted 
from serving its purpose. Instead, paragraph 2 should be read independently of 
paragraph 1.
In 2012, the International Law Association’s (ILA) Committee on Baselines under 
the International Law of the Sea had its mandate expanded for four additional years 
to consider, amongst other issues, “[t]he interpretation and relevant state practice of 
Article 7 of the [LOSC] regarding the method adopted by States of drawing straight 
baselines”.41 Whilst the ILA Committee acknowledge that there is no agreed single 
interpretation of Article 7, the Committee is at odds with the majority of legal schol-
ars in their view that paragraph 2 is subordinate to paragraph 1:
The Committee is of the view that Article 7(2) is to be read independently, and not 
cumulatively, with Article 7(1) and notes the historic basis for this provision is separate 
and distinctive from the criteria outlined in Article 7(1).42
The Committee is clear that “[t]hese criteria are not cumulative and any one of these 
three geographic circumstances will be sufficient for the coastal State to become 
entitled to use the straight baseline method”.43 The Statement of the ILA Committee 
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is inconsistent with previous academic interpretation practice, which to date has 
been justified in the interpretation put forward by the UN Study. Unfortunately, the 
ILA Committee does not comment upon the parts of the UN study which argue for 
the opposite interpretation of paragraph 2, or on previous interpretative practice. 
Instead, it bases its interpretation on the core of the UNCLOS negotiations, recalling 
that paragraph 2 was added to the convention text based on a proposal by Bangladesh 
during the negotiations.44 The main purpose of Bangladesh’s proposal was to lower 
the threshold for deltaic States to establish baselines which take into account the 
special challenges of their coastal areas, not to raise the threshold even higher. 
Keeping in mind the purpose for the inclusion of Article 7(2) in the first place, based 
on the Bangladeshi initiative, it seems clear that Article 7(2) was not intended to be 
subordinate to paragraph 1 of the same Article.
In an era of sea level rise, it is more than timely to reach a conclusion on how para-
graph 2 and its relationship to paragraph 1 should be interpreted. For States vulner-
able to sea level change seeking to secure their maritime entitlements, it is crucial to 
know with which conditions they must be in compliance in order to establish deltaic 
baselines.
4.3 “[A]nd other natural conditions”?
With sea level rise threatening a number of coastlines, vulnerable States are expected 
to raise the question whether sea level rise resulting in a changing coastline may be 
considered as “other natural conditions”, thereby potentially allowing them to draw 
a deltaic baseline around their coast regardless of the actual presence of a delta.
The phrase “other natural conditions” was not part of Bangladesh’s proposal, but 
was added by the informal consultative group.45 The formulation of Article 7(2) has 
been described as unclear46, “not very well drafted”47, “obscure”48 and “ambiguous”49 
in the literature, and it is not at all clear what would constitute such “other natural 
conditions”.
In its study on baselines, the United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea observed that “paragraph 2 of the Article refers to ‘a delta and other natu-
ral conditions’ so that for this paragraph to apply there must be a delta” (emphasis 
added).50 This interpretation is based on a strict literal interpretation of the provision, 
in which the word “and” suggests that the conditions are cumulative.
Bird and Prescott observe that there is disagreement about whether a delta must 
be present, or whether other highly unstable coasts can be treated under Article 7(2). 
They point out that, whilst “the English version and every other official translation 
except Russian insists on the presence of a delta[, t]he Russian version, like the orig-
inal draft in the Informal Single Negotiating Text, refers to ‘deltas or other natural 
conditions’”.51 Stoutenburg acknowledges that the original draft of the provision 
causes confusion, but maintains that the drafters’ intent was to create a “Bangladesh 
exception”, suggesting that the presence of a delta is required to establish straight 
baselines subsequent to Article 7(2).52
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Churchill and Lowe assert that the inclusion of the phrase ‘and other natural con-
ditions’ “appears to refer to causes of coastal instability other than deltas”.53 This 
suggests that the presence of a delta or other natural conditions rendering the coastal 
line highly unstable is an alternative criterion. Roach and Smith similarly replace the 
phrase “and other natural conditions” with “or other natural conditions” (emphasis 
added), suggesting that they interpret them as two alternative reasons for highly 
unstable coastlines.54
The ILA Committee on Baselines under the International Law of the Sea also uses 
the terminology “the presence of a delta or other natural conditions” when it lists the 
instances under which a coastal State can rely upon the method of straight baselines 
(emphasis added).55 Interestingly, the ILA Committee maintains that there are three 
alternative geographical circumstances which can entitle the coastal State to use the 
straight baseline method. The first is a deeply indented coastline; the second is a fringe 
of islands along the coast; and the third is the presence of a delta or other natural con-
ditions rendering the coastline highly unstable.56 The fact that ILA operates with three 
instances of straight baselines, instead of four, suggests that it interprets Article 7(2) as 
one geographic circumstance and that “delta” and “other natural conditions” are 
cumulative requirements. The fact that the ILA replaces the word “and” with the word 
“or”, seemingly without ascribing it a different meaning, leads to unnecessary confu-
sion, although it also paints an accurate picture of the current legal situation.
A similar discussion came up in the South China Sea award, during which the 
tribunal discussed whether the word “or” between the phrases “cannot sustain human 
habitation” and “economic life” entails that these requirements are cumulative or 
alternative.57 The tribunal concluded that “or” meant that the phrases were alterna-
tive requirements, but it also noted that the two terms in practice were closely inter-
linked, admitting that “the two will in most instances go hand in hand”. Oude Elferink 
critically observes that the tribunal in practice interprets the terms as one being ancil-
lary to the other instead of two requirements on equal footing.58 Common to both 
Article 7(2) and Article 121 is that the different interpretations of the terms “and” 
and “or” will have large consequences for the States concerned and therefore need 
more clarification than is currently offered.
In an attempt to set aside the vagueness and obscurity in the phrase “delta and 
other natural conditions”, it can be argued that the decisive requirement in Article 
7(2) is not the presence of a delta or other natural conditions, but rather that “the 
coastline is highly unstable”. If the unstable coastline is the decisive criterion imbed-
ded in Article 7(2), the instability would have to be a result of “the presence of a delta 
and other natural conditions”. Whereas the United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea’s study on baselines defined a delta as “a tract of alluvial land 
enclosed and traversed by diverging mouths of a river”,59 the UN study did not 
define “natural conditions”. Prescott and Schofield discuss what would constitute 
“natural conditions” and observe that the term can be interpreted either as a refer-
ence to other coastal landforms or as a reference to the process affecting the size and 
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configuration of deltas. They argue that it should be up to the States to select whether 
to interpret other natural conditions as landforms or processes.60 Can sea level rise be 
considered such a process?
When the straight baseline regime was negotiated, sea level rise due to climate 
change was not an issue. However, as the phrase “natural condition” is very vague, it 
can be argued that sea level rise is a natural condition, which makes the coastline of 
low-lying States unstable. In 1989, Bird and Prescott noted that “we believe that 
more countries will seek to use Article 7 to minimize the effects of baselines of raising 
sea levels”.61 Similarly, Churchill and Lowe observe that Article 7(2) “may be impor-
tant in the future if predictions of a significant rise in the sea levels as a result of 
global climate change are fulfilled (…)”.62 Schofield and Freestone observe: “Although 
this provision was drafted for specific circumstances, it has long been recognized that 
it could be used in response to sea level rise”.63 Whereas a number of legal scholars 
assert that Article 7(2) may be used to draw straight baselines in response to sea level 
rise, it is remarkable that none of them provide any reasoning for this assertion.
Read in conjunction with the previous discussion, a liberal interpretation of Article 
7(2) would mean that coastal States may draw straight baselines along their coasts 
without having a deeply indented coastline, a fringe of islands, or the presence of 
a delta. The actual requirement for establishing deltaic baselines would be the exis-
tence of another natural condition that renders the coastline “highly unstable”. 
Although perhaps not in accordance with the content of the Bangladesh proposal, 
such an interpretation is in accordance with the overall ambition of the LOSC, 
namely to stabilize the world’s oceans and to contribute to the progressive develop-
ment of the law of the sea.64 This development is achieved by interpreting the provi-
sions in light of the context in which they were negotiated and in light of the context 
in which they are applied.
4.4 Defining a “highly unstable coastline”
If the decisive requirement for establishing straight baselines subsequent to Article 
7(2) is that the coastline is “highly unstable”, it is timely to discuss what highly unsta-
ble means in this context. Brown formulates the question elegantly: “What degree of 
change over what period of time would be considered to constitute a high degree of 
instability?”65 In light of climate change, the question can be further delineated to: 
How large must sea level fluctuations be to constitute a “highly unstable coastline”?
Hoque observes that the phrase “highly unstable” is not well understood and that it 
is not clear which criteria should be used to measure such instability.66 However, Hoque 
does not contribute any further to analysing the content of the phrase. Prescott and 
Schofield, on the other hand, assert that the word ‘unstable’ “probably should be inter-
preted to mean that the location of the low-water line is highly variable in a horizontal 
plane”.67 Therefore, the question arises: “what scale of movements might be described 
as highly unstable”.68 Bird observes that, “[w]hile a few coastlines have advanced or 
retreated more than 100 metres per year, on the world scale a gain or loss of more than 
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10 metres per year has been exceptionally rapid”.69 Recalling from section 1 above, the 
IPCC predicts a global average sea level rise between 26 and 82 centimetres by the end 
of this century.70 It is also well-known that a one-metre rise will flood large areas of 
low-lying States, far greater than a ten-metre annual change in the coastline.
It is not clear where the threshold for a high degree of instability is, but it is quite clear 
from climate change research that sea level rise will have severe consequences for a num-
ber of low-lying and island-States, risking partial or complete submergence of mainland 
or island-territory and thereby also the loss of large maritime areas currently subject to 
national jurisdiction. Without concluding on the exact threshold of what makes up a 
high degree of instability, it seems clear that the predicted and experienced sea level rise 
are well above what constitutes a high degree of instability. Based on the above discus-
sion, it is therefore concluded that coastal States which experience a highly unstable 
coastline due to sea level rise may establish straight baselines subject to Article 7(2).
4.5 Permanent or ambulatory baselines?
In addition to providing States with unstable coastlines with the opportunity to draw 
straight baselines along their coasts, Article 7(2) provides that such baselines shall 
“remain effective” in spite of subsequent regression of the low-water line. This sug-
gests that straight baselines established under Article 7(2) are potentially less vulner-
able to sea level change than normal baselines (Article 5) and straight baselines 
established on the basis of Article 7(1).
However, the LOSC does not seem to offer absolute permanency for delta base-
lines, as it provides that that the baselines shall remain effective “until changed by the 
coastal State in accordance with this Convention”.71 The phrase “until changed” sig-
nals that the limits so established are not intended to be permanent and that, eventu-
ally, States are required to change their delta baselines.72 Soons raises the question 
whether “the coastal State is obliged to [change its delta baseline] at some point in 
time, in order to bring them in accordance with the changed factual situation, or 
whether it is entirely free in deciding to change or not to change the baseline”.73 He 
observes that it was not the intention of the provision to grant the coastal State dis-
cretionary power in this respect. If that were the case, he argues, it would not have 
been necessary to include a reference to subsequent change in the provision in the 
first place.74 Hoque shares Soons' view and observes that, whilst there is no time limit 
within which the baselines are to be revisited, it is quite natural that the coastal State 
will try to keep baselines in their original position for longer periods; if they were 
required to revise them immediately after the changed sea level or recession of the 
coast, the provision would not serve its purpose.75
However, some authors have interpreted Article 7(2) as optional for coastal States, if 
they would like to make changes to the deltaic baselines, as long as changes to baselines 
are in accordance with the LOSC. Di Leva and Morita observe that “[t]his provision 
allows coastal states to change the baseline as long as such a change is in accordance 
with the Convention. If a State does not take any actions to change the baselines, 
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however, the old baseline ‘remains effective’”.76 If the coastal State chooses not to change 
the baseline, the original baseline will remain effective in spite of sea level changes.
Stoutenburg asserts that Article 7(2) is far from fixing the baselines of unstable coasts 
and argues that the provision sanctions the continued validity of outdated baselines 
only until they are changed by the coastal State “in accordance with this convention” as 
prescribed in Article 7(2).77 She observes that, “even in situations not falling under Art. 
7(2) UNCLOS, in practice baselines once established and depicted on charts remain 
in place until the State decides to redraft the charts, even if the low-water line has in fact 
moved”.78 Accordingly, there is not necessarily a significant difference between the 
degrees of permanency of straight baselines established under paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 7. The difference, she argues, is that, for baselines established in accordance 
with Article 7(2), “this practice has been sanctioned by law, whereas in other cases 
states are under the legal obligation to adjust their baselines when necessary”.79
Article 7(3) may provide some direction as to when baselines under Article 7(2) 
should be changed. Paragraph 3 is one of four paragraphs in Article 7 that places con-
ditions for the construction of baselines and provides that “[t]he drawing of straight 
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the 
coast”.80 According to Prescott and Schofield, this condition applies to straight base-
lines established under both paragraphs 1 and 2.81 Reading Article 72(3) in connec-
tion with paragraph 2, it can be argued that, when a coastline has changed dramatically, 
and the delta baseline departs to an appreciable extent from the general direction of 
the coast, the coastal State should adjust its delta baseline to be in conformity with the 
LOSC.82 The UN study specifies that coastal States with straight baselines established 
subsequent to Article 7(2) are “not obliged to amend the basepoints for every charted 
change that takes place” after the limit has been established.83 But the basepoints will 
eventually be changed “when it becomes clear that the low-water line has significantly 
and permanently advanced or retreated from the position originally used”.84
The ILA Committee is mindful of the relationship between Articles 7(3) and 7(2), 
and “notes the potential difficulty which may arise from a strict application of Article 
7(3) to the circumstances outlined in Article 7(2)”. The Committee continues that 
“a highly unstable coastline may be one in which determining the general direction 
of the coast may present significant challenges”.85 Therefore, the Committee argues 
that the general direction criterion in Article 7(3), qualified by the words “to any 
appreciable extent”, should “permit a margin of appreciation for a coastal State seek-
ing to draw straight baselines along a high[ly] unstable coastline”.86 A strict interpre-
tation of Article 7(3) can potentially undermine the purpose of Article 7(2).
4.6 The application of Article 7(2) in State practice
In practice, application of Article 7(2) has been limited. Hoque observes that 
Bangladesh is “the only deltaic State that, more or less, tried to follow the spirit of 
Article 7(2)”.87 Consequently, no State has to date changed its delta baselines, and it 
is not entirely clear how the provision will be interpreted and applied in the future.88
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For comparison, the ILA Straight Baselines Study shows that 80 States have 
claimed straight baselines, 39 of which are subject to protests from other States.89 
Prescott and Schofield observe:
It would be prudent for countries to review the coordinates defining their straight base-
lines at set intervals. This would ensure that any changes in the configuration of the 
low-water line can be recorded and the coordinates of basepoints adjusted. Finland 
seems to be the only country that specified in its declaration of its straight baselines that 
they would be reviewed every 30 years.90
General State practice on Article 7 demonstrates that, whilst many States have 
 established straight baselines, few of them have followed the provisions of Article 7 to 
the letter.91 Most coastal States have relied on a liberal interpretation of the provi-
sion.92 Due to this practice, the question then arises whether this has resulted in new 
customary law regarding straight baselines. Churchill observes that, although the 
number of non-conforming States is substantial, practice is diverse and does not 
point to any particular way in which straight baselines should be drawn. This, cou-
pled with numerous protests over baseline claims, leads Churchill to the conclusion 
that “practice relating to the drawing of straight baselines does not amount either to 
an agreed interpretation of the Convention or a new rule of customary international 
law”.93 This practice paints a different picture than the ICJ did in the Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Question between Qatar and Bahrain, where the ICJ 
observed: “This method must be applied restrictively”.94 Churchill further observes 
that “there is no doubt (…) that such a relatively large amount of practice has weak-
ened the authority of Article 7 of the Convention”, and he acknowledges that “it 
must be admitted that the lack of precision in much of the article also weakens its 
normative status”.95 Although these statements reflect on application of Article 7 as 
a whole, it could be argued that Article 7(2) also suffers from the same lack of preci-
sion and therefore also has a weakened normative status.
The ILA Committee on Baselines observes that, even if State practice does not 
lead to a customary rule, the practice should be reviewed. It argues that, “[a]s a num-
ber of directly interested States have adopted a practice in respect of straight base-
lines that relies on a ‘flexible’ interpretation of Article 7, it should be assessed as an 
element of interpretation of the treaty provisions”.96 This lends support the argument 
that a liberal and flexible interpretation of Article 7(2) potentially offers a solution for 
low-lying states exposed to sea level rise.
5. Concluding remarks
The physical consequences of sea level rise are most likely unavoidable for several 
coastal States due to their geographical location, size and topography. However, there 
is a certain amount of leeway within the LOSC that can contribute to increased sta-
bility and juridical protection of the maritime entitlements for some of the States 
suffering the consequences of sea level rise.
S.V. Busch
188
Article 7 does not provide precise definitions for the key terms that allow for the 
establishment of straight baselines, giving rise to several significant queries.97 In prac-
tice, Article 7 has been interpreted flexibly, or even ignored by many coastal States, 
resulting in a proliferation of excessive claims to straight baselines.98 The ILA 
Committee on Baselines under the International Law of the Sea has acknowledged 
that “there is no agreed single interpretation of Article 7 or a new rule of customary 
international law”.99
Varied State practice on the interpretation and application of Article 7 in general, 
and the absolute lack of State practice on the application of Article 7(2) in particular, 
suggest that there may be room for a liberal interpretation and application of Article 
7(2) that will allow States with a highly unstable coastline due to sea level rise to draw 
more stable, straight baselines along their coasts. Based on the discussions above, it 
seems that the majority of legal scholars argue for such a liberal and flexible interpre-
tation of the provision.
The current uncertainty in boundaries is highly undesirable and may foster 
 conflicting claims to valuable ocean resources.100 An adapted interpretation of 
Article 7(2) as suggested in this paper would provide States with the opportunity to 
adapt to climate change and sea level rise, as well as contribute to preventing new 
conflicts concerning ocean resources without having to invoke the formal amend-
ment procedures of the LOSC. Thus, it seems to be the most efficient way to counter 
the consequences of sea level rise for some vulnerable States.
Unfortunately, a liberal interpretation of Article 7(2) and the rules of baselines 
does not accommodate the needs of all States that are particularly vulnerable to sea 
level rise. For the group of Small Island Developing States, at risk of having one or 
more islands entirely submerged or rendered uninhabitable due to sea level rise, it 
seems unclear whether maritime limits may be upheld if the legal requirements for 
entitlement in Article 121 are no longer fulfilled. It can be argued that only where the 
requirements of Article 121 are met, does the question of the location of baselines 
and maintenance of permanent continental shelf limits come into play.
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